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Gender differences in health and education are a concern for a number of developing countries. While
standard theory predicts human capital should respond to market returns, social norms (e.g., disapproval
of women working outside the home) may weaken or even sever this link for girls. Though many studies
have examined the link between women's wages or labor force participation and investment in girls,
two significant problems are the possibility of omitted variables bias and reverse causality, and difficulty
in identifying which of several mechanisms (returns, bargaining power, income, etc.) link the two.
To overcome these problems, we provided three years of recruiting services to help young women
in randomly selected Indian villages get jobs in the business process outsourcing industry. Girls in
treatment villages were more likely to be in school and had greater measured BMI. We argue that
the design of the experiment (providing opportunities almost exclusively for young, unmarried women
rather than current mothers) allows us to rule out that mechanisms other than increases in the returns
explain our results.
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  There has long been considerable concern over the striking gender disparities in human 
capital outcomes in a number of developing countries, particularly in  Asia. For example, in 
India, the female adult literacy rate is only 48%, compared to 73% for men. And mortality rates 
in infancy and childhood are 40-50% greater for girls than boys, primarily due to inadequate 
provision of nutrition and medical care (Chen, Huq and D'Souza 1981, Sen and Sengupta 1983, 
Das Gupta 1987 and Behrman et al. 1988).
1 The excess mortality of girls contributes to the 
problem of  highly masculine sex ratios  and "missing women"  that has received considerable 
attention (Visaria 1969, Miller 1981, Sen 1990). 
  A  number of studies have focused on the  returns to human capital or the  potential 
economic contributions of women, particularly in agriculture, as an explanation for these gender 
disparities (Boserup 1970, Bardhan 1974, Miller 1981, Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982, Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2009). In varying forms, this argument suggests that human capital investments in 
girls are lower where the returns are lower. However, in many developing countries,  the link 
between human capital returns and outcomes is more ambiguous than would arise from a simple 
application of the standard human capital framework , due to cultural practices and norms. For 
example, Dyson and Moore (1983) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2009) note that the practice of 
patrilocal exogamy (i.e., marriage  between  individuals  from  different  villages,  with  women 
leaving their birth  household to live with their husband's family) mean s  that the returns to 
investing in girls' human capital do not accrue to parents, leaving them with  less incentive to do 
so.
2 In addition, in many societies there are strong social prohibitions against women working 
outside of the home (Boserup 1970, Dube and Palriwala 1990, Field, Jayachandran and Pande 
2010, Goldin 1990, 1995 and Mammen and Paxson 2000). In this setting, the social costs to a 
household of having a woman work may outw eigh the potential income gains . Thus, even if 
parents invested in girls p urely for altruistic reasons  (rather than  for  personal  gains),  girls' 
schooling would still be insensitive to the market returns if women do not work. This is not to 
say that parents will not invest in their daughters at all  (such as for non-market returns); it is 
                                                 
1 See Strauss and Thomas (1995), Behrman (1997) and Haddad et al. (1997) for reviews. 
2 Though they may still invest in girls for other reasons, such as: altruism; the expectation of transfers 
from daughters even though they leave the household; or if the marriage market compensates parents for 
higher human capital daughters (Behrman et al. 1999, Foster and Rosenzweig 2009). 2 
 
simply that if women do not work, investments in girls should not be affected by changes in the 
market returns.
3 In both  examples (patrilocal exogamy and  social prohibitions against women 
working), cultural norms or  practices can  weaken  and possibly even sever the link between 
market returns and investments in girls.  
  Despite the potential theoretical ambiguity, a large literature has documented that greater 
female labor force participation or wages are indeed correlated with improved human capital and 
survival  outcomes for girls  (Kishor 1993, 1995, Murthi, Guio and  Drèze  1995,  Agnihotri, 
Palmer-Jones and Parikh 2002,  Rosenzweig and Shultz 1982 and  Qian 2008). However, two 
important factors make it difficult to conclude that it is the increased  future earnings potential 
that leads  parents  to  invest more in their daughters . First,  most of these studies  use  cross-
sectional data, and concerns about omitted variables bias  (areas where women work differ  in 
many ways from areas where women do not work) or reverse causality (higher human capital 
women are more productive and therefore earn higher wages or are more likely to be in the labor 
force) make it difficult to draw a  causal interpretation from the results, as noted by Sen (1990) 
and Foster and Rosenzweig (2009).
4 Three studies that attempt to address these concerns are 
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) ,  who  use  variation in rainfall as a determinant of   women's 
earnings opportunities,  Qian (2008), who exploits a policy reform in China that differentially 
affected the value of traditionally male and female crops , and  Foster and Rosenzweig (2009) 
who use land prices and yields as measures of expected future technical change and productivity. 
  Second,  most  studies  cannot  specifically  identify  the  mechanism(s)  linking  current 
employment rates or wages among adult women  to investment in  contemporaneously  young 
girls. Beyond expected returns to human capital  (i.e., current economic conditions  for women 
reflect returns daughters will face in the future), there are many other potential channels. First, 
greater earnings opportunities for adult women may increase a mother's bargaining power within 
the household (Thomas 1990, Schultz 1990; see Strauss and Thomas 1995 and  Duflo 2005 for 
surveys). If women prefer to discriminate less against their daughters than their husbands do, that 
increased bargaining power could result in  greater investments in girls.  Second, increases in 
                                                 
3 Behrman et al. (1999) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2009) argue that even if women don't work, their 
education may respond to market returns due to greater demand (and lower dowries) for more educated 
wives, who produce higher human capital sons. However, if we increase the potential returns for women 
only (as in the present case) and women do not work, the marriage market should not respond in this way. 
4 Foster and Rosenzweig (2009) also point out that under patrilocal exogamy, it is the l abor market 
conditions in the villages girls will marry into, not those they are born into, that should matter. 3 
 
women's employment opportunities, all else equal, increase household income. If investment in 
girls is a normal or luxury good, then increases in income may benefit girls (Schultz 2001). 
Third, employment of adult women outside the household may increase the value of daughters, 
as they substitute for the mother in household production activities such as child care or cooking. 
This may increase the incentive for parents to invest in their daughters, both just to ensure they 
survive and can help in the household (Murthi, Guio and Drèze 1995), and because it may make 
them more productive at those tasks.
5 Fourth, by raising the opportunity cost of time, women's 
earnings opportunities may lower fertility, and girls in smaller families may gain more than boys 
when they compete with fewer siblings for limited family resources.
6 
  These mechanisms all yield very different implications for understanding  both the root 
causes of gender bias as well as the policy instruments that will most effectively address the 
problem.
7 Yet, most studies cannot identify  the underlying mechanism.  Qian (2008) provides 
some arguments that bargaining power of women might explain, at least in part, why increases in 
the value of women's crops leads to less male-skewed sex ratios in China, but she also notes that 
it isn't possible to explicitly or directly test this hypothesis against alternatives. 
  In this paper, we use a randomized intervention in India to ask  whether increases in 
employment opportunities for women  lead to greater  human capital investments in girls. The 
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industry in India has grown rapidly over the past decade, 
creating  a  significant  number  of  new,  high -paying  opportunities,  particularly  for  women. 
However, because it was such a new sector, aw areness of these jobs and knowledge of how to 
                                                 
5 Of course, the additional time demands of household production could instead lower girls' schooling. 
6 Fifth, if a woman's husband, older children or in-laws take over child care when she enters the labor 
market,  and  some  of  these  individuals  have  lower  preferences  for  discrimination  against  girls,  then 
women working may lead to gains for girls (women may have stronger reasons to favor sons because they 
are often forced out of their home or lose their land to their husband's family when he dies unless she has 
a son (Agarwal 1994, Chen 2000)). Finally, where women have more employment opportunities, they in 
effect have an insurance mechanism to cope with the unemployment, disability or death of their husbands, 
as well as a source of income to save for old age and possibly even a pension. If one reason sons are 
favored in the provision of human capital is that they serve a similar insurance or old age support role for 
their parents, greater economic opportunities for women weakens the need to do so. 
7 For example, if bargaining power explains the correlation between women's employment and investment 
in girls, then policies aimed at strengthening women's bargaining power, such as reform or enforcement 
of  divorce  laws  or  strengthening  women's  property  rights,  might  be favored over  efforts  to  promote 
women's employment. If it is instead an income effect, then the best policies are those that promote 
income growth, rather than specifically promoting women's opportunities. Similarly, efforts to directly 
address fertility or access to old age, unemployment or disability insurance would be favored if those 
mechanisms are the relevant ones. 4 
 
access them was very limited, especially outside of the urban core and among less educated 
households.  Our  intervention  provided  three  years  of  BPO  recruiting  services  to  women  in 
randomly  selected  rural  villages.  By  connecting  women  to  experienced  recruiters,  the 
intervention was designed to increase awareness of and access to these new opportunities.
8 
  Our goal is to test whether the increased employment opportunities for women  lead to 
greater  human capital investments  in  girls.  The  study offers two key advantages.   First,  the 
intervention provided random assignment of potential employment opportunities (or, awareness 
of and access to these opportunities). This allows us to overcome potentially serious problems of 
omitted variables bias and reverse causality, and results in a weaker identifying assumption and a 
stronger case for causality than in the cross-sectional and natural experiment studies listed above. 
  Second,  the  intervention  allows  us  to  isolate  returns  as  the  mechanism  linking 
employment opportunities and human capital investments in our case, eliminating the alternative 
mechanisms identified above. All of the non-returns mechanisms listed above in effect focus on 
the impact of employment of current mothers on investments in their daughters, such as a mother 
having more say over household decisions when she earns a greater share of household income , 
or changes in the value of the daughter to the household when her mother works. However, our 
intervention  created  opportunities  primaril y  for  younger,  unmarried  women,   since  most 
employers in this sector strongly favor this group (Ng and Mitter 2005) and because most of the 
jobs require a secondary school degree, English language skills and  familiarity with computers, 
all of which are uncommon among  older women. Further, in our project area very few married 
women, especially those with young children, work outside the household (much less commute 
long distances  or migrate, which would be required for these urban -based  jobs), so these 
opportunities would not apply to them, but instead  apply in the future to their daughters. Thus, 
our experiment enhanced the future returns for currently young girls, leaving the employment 
opportunities for older women  (current mothers) unchanged. This design in effect shuts off  all 
links driven by changes in the employment of current mothers. 
  Using panel data  spanning a three year period , we find  that the  BPO recruiting and 
placement services increased employment among young women, with no effect for older women 
or men of any age (as per the design of the experiment). Girls aged 5-15 in villages that received 
                                                 
8 In this respect, the paper is similar to Jensen (2010), who finds that providing information on the returns 
to schooling increases educational attainment among boys in the Dominican Republic.  5 
 
the recruiting services were 3 to 5 percentage points more likely to be in school and experienced 
an increase in Body Mass Index, reflecting greater nutrition and/or medical care. However, there 
was no net gain in height. For boys, there was no change in any of these measures. 
  Three other studies have documented changes similar to those found here. Munshi and 
Rosenzweig (2006) find that enrollment in English language schools increased for girls (but not 
boys) in response to increases in the returns to English language education in Bombay, driven 
principally  by  the  expansion  of  the  financial  sector  and  other  white  collar  industries.  More 
closely  related,  Oster  and  Millet  (2010)  use  school-level  panel  data  to  show  that  towns  in 
southern India that saw the introduction of a call center experienced large increases in school 
enrolment for both boys and girls. Finally, Shastry (2010) finds that the information technology 
sector grew more rapidly in areas of India where English is more widely spoken, and that in turn 
those areas experienced increased school enrolment. The results we find are broadly consistent 
with  these  other  studies.  As  noted,  the  key  advantages  of  the  present  study  are  the  weaker 
identifying assumption due to randomization, and an intervention that allows us to isolate returns 
as the mechanism linking the new opportunities for women to investments in girls. 
  The results have important policy implications. With respect to the significant concern 
over gender differences in health and education and skewed sex ratios in many low income 
countries, many authors have suggested that cultural barriers prevent investment in girls, and that 
change will not  be possible without social  or cultural  change.  Correspondingly, most policy 
efforts have emphasized awareness raising, and information and media strategies to promote the 
status of girls, i.e., efforts to act on any social or cultural component of bias (Croll 2000). Our 
results suggest that the labor market plays an important role and that efforts to expand economic 
opportunities for women can have significant impacts. Our results also provide insight into the 
underlying  causes  of  poor  education  and  health  for  both  boys  and  girls  more  generally  in 
developing countries. Much of the literature has focused on poverty and credit constraints, or 
"supply side" factors such as distance or access to schools or health clinics, costs, staff training, 
etc. While these factors are certainly important, since our experiment changed nothing except 
awareness of the returns to human capital, our results show that there are important "demand-
side" constraints as well. This suggests that low demand, driven by low returns, may contribute 
to low human capital attainment in poor countries.  6 
 
  The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the experimental 
design and Section III discusses the data and empirical strategy. Section IV shows the results and 
Section V concludes. 
 
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
II. A. The BPO Sector in India 
  The Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industry is a broad umbrella covering a range 
of activities and "back office" services. The most highly publicized of these jobs are call centers 
(e.g., customer service, taking reservations), but the industry is much larger, and also includes 
data  entry  and  management,  claims  processing,  secretarial  services,  transcription  and  online 
technical support, as well as more skilled activities such as accounting or software development. 
While the industry has been around in some form for decades, recent technological changes in 
telecommunications  and  networking  infrastructure  (for  example,  the  development  and  global 
deployment of fiber optic cable networks) have made it both possible and relatively inexpensive 
to provide these services remotely to clients around the world.
9 This in turn lead to dramatic 
growth in the BPO export sector in many low-wage countries, particularly those like India where 
English is spoken. BPO growth in India wa s also facilitated by regulatory changes allowing 
greater  foreign  investment  in  the  telecommunications  sector.  Overall,  India's  BPO  sector 
experienced 30-40% average annual growth rates from 2000 to 2008 (NASSCOM 2009). 
  Within the BPO sector,  particularly call centers, there appears to be  a preference for 
female workers. A study of 2,500 call centers in 17 countries found that on average, 69% of 
frontline call center workers are women (Holman, Batt and Holtgrewe 2007). Though the rate 
was closer to 45% in India, this is still high in comparison to the sex ratio of employment in most 
other industries. The  study reported several reasons  employers preferred women, including  a 
more pleasant voice and demeanor when interacting with customers, and the belief that women 
were more trustworthy than men.
10 
  Thus, technological and regulatory changes in the BPO sector  in India created a sharp 
and fairly sudden increase in the demand for female workers, particularly those with secondary 
                                                 
9 Much of the BPO sector is export-driven. For example, in India, almost three-quarters of call centers 
serve international markets (Holman, Batt and Holtgrewe 2007). 
10 It is also possible that because women have fewer alternative employment opportunities than men, they 
can be paid less or treated worse, without risk they will leave the job. 7 
 
school degrees or higher and English language skills. In order to meet this demand, there was a 
surge in recruiting activities, including through newly-formed, specialized private contractors 
and subcontractors who would seek out and screen potential employees. And because the BPO 
sector is strongly geographically concentrated in India, with 95% of employment focused around 
seven major cities, recruiting was fairly geographically concentrated as well, leading to large, 
localized increases in economic opportunities for women. 
  In  general,  BPO  jobs  are  fairly  well-paid  in  relative  terms.  Starting  salaries  with  no 
experience  often  ranged  from  5,000−10,000  Rupees  (Rs.)  per  month  in  2003  (about  $U.S. 
110−220, 1 Rs.≈0.022 $U.S.), which was about 2-10 times the average starting pay for women 
outside of the BPO sector. Salaries also often increase rapidly with experience, whereas many 
other jobs have relatively flat compensation profiles.  
 
II. B. The Intervention 
  Though the BPO sector created a large number of employment opportunities for women, 
there remained significant gaps in awareness about those jobs and how to access them, precisely 
because the industry was so new. This was even more pronounced outside the urban centers 
where these jobs were located (in fact, in our 2003 baseline survey of rural households described 
below, no one was employed in this sector, including any members or children of members 
having temporarily or permanently left the household). Our experiment was designed to both 
increase awareness of these jobs and to make it easier for qualified women to get them. 
We  hired  eight  BPO  recruiters  (5  women  and  3  men),  all  with  at  least  two  years 
experience overall and at least 6 months specifically recruiting women (either working directly 
for  recruiting  firms  or  as  freelancers).  We  drew  the  recruiters  from  Delhi,  one  of  the  most 
important cities for the BPO sector. Using maps, the recruiters were asked to identify the specific 
areas  within  and  outside  of  Delhi  they  had  visited  for  recruiting,  and  then  to  define  the 
approximate  areas  outside  of  Delhi  beyond  which  they  believed  BPO  recruiters  would  be 
unlikely to visit due solely to their relative distance from the city and/or their population size. 
This  allowed  us  to  establish  a  list  of  where  awareness  of  and  access  to  BPO  employment 
opportunities was likely to be lower, not because there were no qualified women, but simply 
because the cost per potential recruit was high enough that recruiters chose to visit other areas 
instead. From this list we drew 80 treatment and 80 control villages at random (most located 8 
 
approximately 50-150km from Delhi) from the states of Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh. This study region includes much of the area where gender disparities are concentrated 
in India today. Haryana and Punjab in particular have the most masculine sex ratios in India, and 
appear  to  be  the  only  two  states  where  sex  ratios  continue  to  worsen  rather  than  improve 
(Dasgupta, Chung and Shuzhou 2009). And our sample includes some of the districts with the 
most extreme incidence of gender bias. For example, if we rank India's 593 districts by the sex 
ratio of children aged 0-6 in the 2001 census, our sample includes the 3
rd (Kurukshetra, with a 
ratio of 770 girls per 100 boys), 10
th (Srangur, 784) and 22
nd (Karnal, 808) worst districts.  
For  the  treatment  villages,  between  December  2003  and  February  2004,  a  randomly 
assigned recruiter would visit and make a small introduction at schools and to local leaders, 
announcing that they would be visiting the village at a designated date a few weeks later to 
provide information on employment opportunities in the BPO sector. They also contacted and 
worked with local leaders, government officials and NGOs to advertise the sessions. 
 Within a few weeks, the recruiters would visit the village and set up an information and 
recruiting session. The sessions were open to women only.
11 All women could attend, but it was 
made clear that the job opportunities were primarily for women with a secondary school degree, 
and preferably some English language ability and experience with computers. This in effect ruled 
out a vast majority of women over the age of 25; for example, in our  data only 8 percent of 
women aged 26-50 have completed secondary school. 
The sessions were held in a range of facilities including schools and NGO or government 
offices, and typically lasted from 4 to 6 hours. The sessions drew a great  deal of local interest 
and attendance was generally high. The recruiters did not have a fixed script, but were required 
to  follow a specific organization .  In particular,  after introducing themselves, the recruiters  
provided:  an  overview  of  the  BPO  sector  a nd  the  specific  types  of  jobs  and  level  of 
compensation available;  information on the names of  specific  firms  currently or  frequently 
looking for workers; strategies for how to apply for jobs (how to create and submit resumes, plus 
lists  of  websites  and  phone  numbers);  interview skills  lessons  and  tips;   mock interviews; 
                                                 
11 In a second set of 80 treatment villages, we provided recruiting services for both men and women. This 
treatment was designed to test both whether a "gender neutral" increase in economic opportunities would 
still  benefit  girls,  as  well  as  a  theory  of  parental  investment  in  children  in  the  face  of  imperfect 
commitment. The latter requires a greater theoretical and empirical treatment of the parental decision 
making process, and is left to a companion paper (Jensen and Miller 2010). Here we simply note that the 
human capital gains for girls in this second set of treatment villages is very similar to what is found here. 9 
 
assessment of English language skills; and a question and answer session. The recruiters were 
required to emphasize that the jobs were competitive, so they were not in any way guaranteeing 
employment.  
One and two years after the initial treatment (i.e., December 2004 to February 2005 and 
December 2005 to January 2006), we provided "booster shots," with the recruiters again visiting 
the same treatment villages and providing the same session. After each of the three sessions, the 
recruiters  left  their  personal  contact  information  so  that  any  woman  could  follow  up  for 
additional  information  or  assistance,  at  no  cost.  The  recruiters  were  contracted  to  provide 
ongoing  support  for  anyone  from  the  designated  villages.  Thus,  the  intervention  consisted 
(exclusively) of three in-depth sessions and three years of continuous placement support. 
We  wish  to  note  that  our  goal  is  not  to  test  whether  recruiting  services  as  a  policy 
instrument can help address gender disparities in human capital. While it is certainly worthwhile 
to make sure that information on economic opportunities is widely available, our intervention 
does not actually create any new jobs for women. The women in our study may simply get jobs 
at the expense of other women, with no net effect on women's employment overall.
12 The goal of 
the experiment is to supply exogenous variation in employment opportunities to test whether the 
change in potential returns influences household investment in girls. 
One important  aspect of the  intervention  worth highlighting  is that the  employment 
opportunities were white collar. While the distinction is commonly overlooked in the literature, 
for women the distinction may be particularly important. Boserup (1970), Costa (2000), Goldin 
(1990, 1995, 2006) and Mammen and Paxson (2000)  argue that there may be less of a social 
stigma associated with women working in white collar jobs. These jobs are considered safer and 
"cleaner" than manual labor such as factory work.
13 This may have particular relevance for India, 
                                                 
12 Though if growth of the sector and competition with other BPO firms internationally was constrained 
by  a  shortage  of  skilled  labor,  or  if  providing  information  to  a  broader  pool of  potential  applicants 
improves  the  quality  of  the  worker-job  match  or  increases  overall  productivity  in  the  sector,  net 
employment could potentially increase. 
13  Though there are some respects in which BPO jo bs are considered less appropriate for women, 
particularly in rural areas. For example, women may have to commute for these jobs, and parents or 
husbands might perceive risks in women traveling alone. For more remote areas, taking one of these jobs 
might require migrating to a city and possibly living on their own, which parents may not want. Finally, 
some BPO jobs, particularly those in call centers servicing daytime hours in the United States, require 
working and commuting and night, which might be percei ved as even less safe for women. Thus, some 
households would not want any female members to hold one of these jobs, and we expect they would 
therefore not be affected by the treatment (either in terms of employment or human capital). 10 
 
since an important aspect of the caste system is the designation that certain jobs, which are 
supposed to be set aside for "untouchables" outside the caste system, are considered "impure" or 
"polluting." Another relevant distinction is that women have a comparative advantage in this 
type  of  employment,  since  it  does  not  require  physical  strength.  We  would  therefore  not 
necessarily generalize our findings to increases in the returns in agriculture (as in Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2009) or the blue-collar sector such as manufacturing (as in Atkin 2009). However, 
we feel the experiment is relevant for understanding the consequences of changes in women's 
employment  for  several  reasons.  First,  the  Indian  economy,  along  with  that  of  most  other 
countries, is shifting towards the service sector, where white collar employment predominates. 
Services are the most rapidly growing sector in India, currently accounting for over 60% of GDP 
(up from 26-28% in the 1980s), with the IT sector alone comprising 8% of GDP (up from 1% 
just  a  decade  ago).  Second,  throughout  the  world,  much  of  the  modern  history  of  women's 
increasing paid labor force participation (particularly for married women) is driven by the white 
collar, service or clerical sectors (Boserup 1970, Goldin 1990, 1995, 2006, Costa 2000, Mammen 
and Paxson 2000). It was only in these sectors that jobs were considered to be acceptable or 
respectable  for  women.  In  fact,  our  experiment  relating  to  information  technology  may  be 
particularly apt in light of the historical evidence; for example, Goldin (2006) notes that the rise 
in female labor force participation in the United States in the early 20th century was due to 
growth in office and clerical jobs arising in part from innovations in information technology. 
 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
A. Survey Information 
We conducted a baseline household survey during September and October of 2003 for 
each of the 160 treatment and control villages. The survey was conducted by students at the 
Management Development Institute, a business school outside of Delhi. In each of the villages, 
we worked  with  a local official to draw  up  a  list of households,  and  randomly selected  20 
households per village. The sampling was conducted independently of the intervention, and thus 
the sample contains some individuals that attended the recruiting sessions and some that did not. 
The  survey  consisted  of  a  household  questionnaire  and  an  adult  questionnaire.  The 
household questionnaire included questions on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
(age, sex, and education of all members, expenditures, etc.). We also asked for demographic and 11 
 
socioeconomic characteristics of all household members or children of members who have either 
temporarily  or  permanently  left  the  household.  The  adult  questionnaire  was  asked  of  all 
individuals  aged  18  and  older.  This  questionnaire  included  information  on  norms  and 
expectations  (work,  marriage,  dowry,  old  age  support,  etc.),  the  most  relevant  of  which  are 
described below. 
Enumerators also weighed and measured the height of all household members aged 5 and 
older.
14 If someone was not home at the time of the  survey, enumerators scheduled up to three 
return visits to take these measurements, and would also visit other locations if the person liv ed 
away from home. As a result, we were able to get weight and height measurements for 98% of 
youths aged 5-15 (who will be the focus of our analysis) in round 1 and 99% in round 2. These 
data  are  particularly valuable because they are objective and thus more likely to accurately 
reflect changes in nutrition and health care provided to children. 
A second round, follow-up survey with the same households was conducted in September 
and October of 2006. With a few exceptions noted below, the survey instrument for the second 
round was the same as the first, and enumerators again weighed and measured al l household 
members aged 5 and older. We also tracked, and where possible measured,  all individuals who 
left home between the rounds (such as for work or marriage).  
Thus, overall, the project time-line was as follows. The baseline survey was conducted in 
August and September of 2003. The first recruiting sessions were carried out from Decem ber 
2003 to February 2004. The  follow-up, booster-shot recruiting sessions were carried out from 
December 2004 to February 2005  and December 2005 to February 2006 . The second round 
survey was conducted  in September and October of 2006. Recruiting assistance was available 
continuously from the time of the first session through the second round survey  (and one year 
beyond that as well), spanning nearly 3 years. 
Before turning to the data, we discuss attrition. Our analysis will  focus on children aged 
5-15 (in round 2), since most of these children will still live at home and therefore be measured. 
It is therefore important to examine attrition (or non-measurement in general) for this group, and 
                                                 
14 Enumerators used consumer-grade bathroom scales and marked boards or measuring tape, and were 
trained to approximate as closely as possible the protocols in the 1988 National Health and Nutrition 
Examination  Survey  (NHANES)  III  manual.  While  the  absence  of  a  fixed  setting  and  trained 
professionals likely introduced imprecision, the errors should be uncorrelated with the treatment and 
therefore should not bias our regression results. 12 
 
whether  it  is  correlated  with  the  treatment.  One  specific  concern  is  the  possibility  that  the 
intervention affected whether children left home due to work, school, marriage or death (all of 
which we gathered data on).
15 As noted, we gathered information about children of household 
members who had left home, and where possible tracked and weighed and measured them .
16 In 
our sample, the overall fraction of 5-15 year olds living away from home at baseline is less than 
1 percent. Additionally, slightly less than 1 percent of children living at home could not be 
measured (for reasons including infirmity or temporary absence from the home).  Total attrition 
for children aged 2-12 at baseline (and thus 5-15 at round 2) was 4.6 percent, about 3 percent of 
which was attrition of entire households (i.e., no one from the round 1 household was present at 
the same residence in round 2).
17 Total attrition among girls 5-12 in the treatment villages was 
4.7 percent, compared to 4.5 percent for the control villages. Though the difference in attrition 
for the treatment and control groups is small, it is possible there were large but offsetting effects 
of the treatment on attrition, and it is difficult to determine the possible bias this may  introduce. 
Below, we assess the sensitivity of our results to assumptions on the outcomes of attriters. 
 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
  Table I reports summary statistics for the full sample and separately by treatment status, 
as well as tests of treatment-control balance in baseline characteristics. The variables overall 
appear  balanced  between  the  control  and  the  treatment  groups.  Formal  tests  suggest  that 
randomization  was  successful:  the  p-value  for  the  F–test  that  baseline  characteristics  jointly 
predict treatment is 0.71 and variable-by-variable individual tests cannot reject that the means are 
the same for treatment and control groups for almost all variables (column 4). 
  The  table  provides  evidence  of  gender  differences  in  education.  The  average  adult 
woman's years of schooling is 1.8, compared to 3.8 for men. Similarly, only 74% of girls aged 7-
                                                 
15 The expected bias is difficult to predict. If the intervention lead to delayed marriage for girls with the 
greatest pre-treatment human capital (since they would benefit the most from staying in school longer to 
get a BPO job), the sample of non-attriting treatment girls will have greater human capital on average 
than the non-attriting control girls even if the treatment had no effect (though marriage is very uncommon 
for girls under age 15). Alternatively, the higher human capital children might be sent away to better 
schools because of the new economic opportunities, leaving the non-attriting treatment children with 
lower human capital on average than the non-attriting control children, again just due to selection. 
16 We were able to locate and weigh and measure 62% of children 5-15 who left home between rounds. 
17 For attriting households, we chose replacement households at random from the original population lists. 
Below we will use only the data from the panel, but the results are robust to including the replacements. 13 
 
15 are currently enrolled in school, compared to 87% of boys (all enrollment data were verified 
by contacting schools that students said they attended). 
  Since weight and height vary considerably over the 5-15 age range, we computed z-
scores for height-for-age (HFA) and Body Mass Index(BMI)-for-age (BFA) using the age- and 
sex-specific standards for school-aged children and adolescents developed by the World Health 
Organization (de Onis et al. 2007). These measures are considered the appropriate indicators of 
growth and development for children aged 5-19 and reflect the provision of nutrition and health 
care.
18 The table shows that children in  the sample are undernourished, with  very low weight 
(BMI) and height relative to international norms. On average, children aged 5 -15 are 1.2 to 1.3 
standard deviations below their age - and sex-specific reference median BMI, and 2 standard 
deviations below the reference median height. The BMI and height data taken on their own do 
not however indicate any differential between boys and girls. This somewhat surprising result is 
also found in other data sets; for example, in the 3 rounds of the National Family Health Survey, 
there is almost no difference in anthropometric measures for boys and girls under the age of  5 
(IIPS 1995, IIPS and ORC Macro 2000, IIPS and Macro International 2007),
19 despite the fact 
that mortality rates for girls are significantly higher in this age range and a large literature 
documents differential treatment of boys and girls. There are several reasons why anthropometric 
measures may not detect gender differences, and it is beyond the scope of the present paper to 
resolve this issue.
20 However, for our analysis, we will  examine changes in BFA and  HFA, 
which should reflect changes in the provision of nutrition and/or medical care. 
  The table also provides evidence about norms affecting investment in girls. In particular, 
adults aged 18 and older were asked whether they thought it was acceptable for women to work 
for pay away from home at various stages in their lives: before they are  married; after they are 
married but before they have children; after they have children, but before those children have 
gone to school; after all their children are in school;  and after their children have left the 
household. Overall, most people do not support women working for pay away from home. Only 
                                                 
18 The WHO also computes weight-for-age standards, but only up to age 10 because it is not considered 
an informative measure for older children (de Onis et al. 2007), so we do not use it here. 
19 For example, in the 2005/6 survey measuring children 5 and under, the mean height -for-age, weight-
for-height and weight-for-age z-scores are identical for boys and girls (-1.9, -1.0 and -1.8, respectively). 
20 For example, while lower nutrition should lead to girls being lighter and shorter for a given age, this 
may be offset by lower nutrition also causing death for the least healthy children. Deaton (2007) discusses 
the potential offsetting impacts of these "scarring" vs. "selection" effects. 14 
 
17 percent of adults believe it is appropriate for a woman to work for pay before marriage. This 
declines to 7 percent after she is married but before she has children. Not shown in the table, this 
declines even further to 4 percent when her children are not yet in school and 5 percent after all 
children are in school, then increases to 14 percent after all children have left the household. 
  Adults were also asked whether they think it is appropriate for adults to accept financial 
support from their sons and daughters in old age. The differences are striking. While almost all 
adults (97 percent) say it is appropriate to accept support from sons, only 4 percent say it is 
appropriate to accept support from daughters. 
  Thus, under prevailing norms/expectations, the incentive to educate girls may be quite 
low, especially compared to boys. While parents may still invest in their daughters for non-
financial reasons, these investments may not respond to increases in market returns. Of course, 
these are just subjective, self-reports, which may deviate from true beliefs or practice in either 
direction. We view these data as simply suggestive, and consistent with the large anthropological 
and ethnographic literature. 
 
C. Empirical Strategy 
For each human capital measure, we present three specifications. First, we regress round 
2 outcomes for children (aged 5-15 for weight-for-age and BMI-for-age, and 7-15 for schooling, 
since most children do not enroll until age 6 or 7) on an indicator for residing in a treatment 
village, separately for boys and girls: Yi=β0+β1Treatmenti+εi, where Treatment is a dummy 
equal to one if the child, i, lives in a village that was exposed to the recruiting intervention. We 
limit  the  sample  to  children  under  15  to  minimize  selective  attrition,  given  the  increasing 
likelihood of leaving the household for work or marriage after this age. Limiting the sample in 
this way also means that we are examining changes in human capital (e.g., BMI) not for those 
individuals who got placed in one of the BPO jobs, but younger children for whom the recruiting 
sessions represent future economic opportunities, which their parents might respond to now. 
The  second  specification  adds  controls  that  are  baseline  predictors  of  human  capital, 
Yi=β0+β1Treatmenti+ 𝗾𝑖 𝑍𝑖 + εi  (parent's  education,  log  of  family  expenditure  per  capita, 
family size and child age). Our third specification uses the change in outcomes between rounds 1 
and 2, rather than round 2 levels, ∆Yi=β0+β1Treatmenti+εi, for children aged 5-12 in round 1 
(and thus 8-15 in round 2). While the three specifications should yield similar estimates of the 15 
 
effect of the treatment, they will in general not be identical. For example, the samples they cover 
will be slightly different, since the changes specification cannot include children 5-7 in round 2 
(because they will have been 2-4 in round 1, and thus not weighed or measured) or any children 
not measured in round 1 for reasons such as absence from the household. Further, although 
randomization should result in treatment and control groups being similar across all variables, in 
any particular sample there can be small baseline differences, and the regressions with controls 
or using changes will capture some of these differences.  
For all specifications, we estimate linear regressions regardless of whether the outcomes 
are continuous or discrete, but limited dependent variable models yield nearly identical results. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level. 
  Since  we  are  considering  the  impact  of  the  treatment  on  a  number  of  outcomes,  in 
addition to presenting the results for each individual outcome, we present two other statistics. 
The first is the mean effect of the treatment across outcomes, computed using the methodology 
described in Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007). This approach standardizes all variables to mean 
zero and unit standard deviation and redefines  them where necessary so that a higher value 
constitutes an improvement. The average effect is computed as the unweighted average of the 
coefficient on the treatment variable for each of the standardized outcomes. We also provide F-
tests of the null hypothesis that the effect of the treatment is jointly zero for all outcomes.  
 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Employment  
  The recruiters reported placing a significant number of women in jobs in the treatment 
villages (about 900 over the three year period). Of course, some of these women might have 
gotten jobs in this sector or other sectors even without the recruiters, which we can net out 
through comparison to the control group. To assess the impact of the treatment on women's 
employment with our survey data, we regress an indicator for whether an individual works for 
pay  in  a  non-family  enterprise
21  in the second survey roun d  on an indicator for living in a 
                                                 
21 We prefer this measure over BPO-only employment for several reasons. First, though we gathered 
detailed job data (via open-ended responses on occupation, industry and employer), defining the exact 
boundaries of the sector is difficult (just matching which women in our sample got a job from one of our 
recruiters would not capture the employment gain since some control and treatment women could have 
gotten these jobs without recruiters). Further, to the extent that the recruiters provided job search skills 
that helped women get jobs in other sectors (ex., bank teller), we would want to count these gains as well. 16 
 
treatment village. As noted above, employment data were gathered for all household members 
and children of members, including those not living at home (either temporarily or permanently), 
so we include these individuals in the sample as well. Since the treatment was focused only on 
younger women, we split the sample into age and sex categories. 
  Table  II  shows  the  results.  In  villages  that  received  the  recruiting  treatment,  paid 
employment was 2.4 percentage points higher for women aged 18−24. The effect is large when 
compared to the Round 2 control group mean for women of this age of about 21 percent.
22 As 
expected given the experimental design, there was no change  in paid employment  for women 
aged 25−44 or 45 and older. The coefficients for these two groups are extremely small and not 
statistically significant. Similarly, there is no impact on employment for men of any age, again 
consistent  with  the  experimental  design.  Thus  overall,  the  recruiting  intervention  increased 
employment specifically for the set of younger women it was targeted towards, and only those 
women.
23 It is these gains that we predict may have effects on investments in girls. 
     
B. Effect on Human Capital 
  Table III shows the effects of the treatment on education and anthropometric measures. 
The  first  set  of  columns  shows  the  specification  where  the  dependent  variable  is  Round  2 
outcomes with no additional controls, the  middle columns add baseline controls, and the last 
columns examine changes in outcomes between the two rounds. Girls (top panel) were about 5 
percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school in the treatment villages. The coefficient is 
robust across the three specifications, and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all 
                                                                                                                                                             
Finally, if we focus only on BPO jobs, we could overestimate the impact of the treatment since some 
women may just shift to this sector from, say, other white collar jobs, with no net gain in employment. 
22 It is unlikely that  the jobs gained in treatment villages came at the expense of women in the control 
villages. The pool of women competing for these jobs is large, so the loss of jobs within our set of control 
villages is likely to be very small; and since few women in rural areas get these jobs, any losses are likely 
to be found in urban areas, which are outside our sample. Though the interpretation would largely be the 
same in the face of such effects; observing human capital reductions for girls where job opportunities for 
women decline would still show that returns affect investments (unless we believe there are  asymmetric 
effects where girls are harmed when opportunities decline but do not gain when they increase).  
23 The intervention could have lead to employment gains for men or older women if  those who attended 
the sessions shared the information or helped recruit others once they got a job. However, most older 
women are married and do not work, have too little education or do not speak English. There are several 
reasons why men's employment may not have changed: men may have already had access to other high-
education jobs; BPO employers may also have preferred to hire women ; and caste-based job networks 
may have limited men's occupational mobility, as found in Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006). 17 
 
cases. The effects are large, representing about 6-7 percent gains for the treatment group relative 
to the control group (control group means are presented at the bottom of each column), and close 
about 40 percent of the baseline boy-girl gap in enrollment (Table I).  
  Columns 2, 5 and 8 show that the treatment also resulted in an average increase in BMI-
for-age  z-score  of  about  0.20-0.30  for  girls,  again  significant  at  the  1  percent  level  in  all 
specifications. The effect is fairly large, particularly relative to the control group mean deficit of 
1.3; the treatment closed about 15-20 percent of the BMI gap between our sample and the well-
nourished WHO reference population. Finally, columns 3, 6 and 9 show that point estimates of 
the effect of the treatment on height-for-age are positive, but very small and not statistically 
significant in any of the specifications.
24  
  Overall, we find positive point effects of the treatment on human capital outcomes for all 
three measures, but only two of the three are statistically significant.  The bottom rows of the 
panel provide a summary assessment of the effects. With both the Kling-Liebman-Katz average 
effect and the F-test, we can reject the hypothesis that the treatment had no effect across the set 
of human capital  measures  for  girls  at  the  one  percent  level  or better  for each of the three 
empirical specifications. 
   The bottom panel of the table shows the effect of the treatment for boys. The coefficients 
are small across all three human capital measures in all specifications, and none are statistically 
significant. The absence of an effect for boys is consistent with the intervention having increased 
the expected returns for girls only. However, it is perhaps surprising that parents were able to 
increase investments in girls without decreasing investment in boys. This suggests that poverty 
and credit constraints may not be as important as "demand constraints" in limiting investment in 
girls, i.e., parents may be providing little to girls not because they can't afford to, but because 
they don't find it optimal to, due to low expected returns. 
  Of course, we are only able to measure short-run effects, and the longer run effects may 
be greater or smaller. For example, if a girl is provided better nutrition or health care for more 
than  three  years,  there  may  be  a  greater  cumulative  effect  on  weight  or  height.  Also,  our 
anthropometric results focus on children aged 5 to 15, and the effects of nutrition or health care 
may be greater for infants (Russell and Rhoads 2008). Alternatively, it is possible we overstate 
                                                 
24 The medical literature suggests that nutrition appears to have little effect on height after the age of 2, 
including any possible "catch up" effects (Russell and Rhoads 2008). Thus, though we were not aware of 
it when designing the study, it is perhaps not surprising that we find no effect of the treatment on height. 18 
 
the long-run effects; improved nutrition for younger girls may simply lead to an earlier onset of 
puberty, rather than long-term gains in weight.
25 The effect of nutrition and medical care on the 
onset of puberty and long-term outcomes is complex, and beyond the scope of the present paper 
to determine. However, for our conclusions, even if the intervention only lead to an earlier onset 
of puberty with no ultimate adult weight gain, this would still serve as an indicator that there had 
been greater nutrition and/or health care investments in girls. Our interest in the anthropometric 
measures is as an indicator of those unobserved investments; it seems unlikely there is another 
mechanism through which the  intervention might have influenced the onset of puberty, so we 
would still conclude that nutrition and/or health care for girls had improved in response to the 
increased potential returns. Finally, we should also mention that it is possible that the long -run 
effects of our intervention may be smaller than what is observed here if parents "overreact" to the 
treatment and overestimate the future returns to girls' human capital, and later adjust expectations 
downward  (because, say,  they observe that  not every woman gets a high paying BPO job) . 
However, again, our goal is not to test the impact of  this recruiting intervention as a policy 
instrument, but whether some signal of increased returns leads to greater investment in girls. 
 
C. Attrition 
  As noted, because we are only able to weigh and measure children living at home, we 
may be selectively missing some girls who differ in human capital from those still living at 
home. Though at baseline there should be no difference between treatment and control villages 
along this dimension, if our intervention caused some girls to stay home longer, such as by 
delaying marriage for work or more schooling, we may systematically skew the treatment sample 
and conclude there is an effect of the treatment even if there is none (we noted above that the 
treatment and control groups have similar attrition rates, but there could be offsetting effects). 
Attrition has less of an impact for our schooling measure, since parents are asked to provide 
information on schooling for children not at home (which we verify by contacting schools); thus, 
we primarily lose data for children whose entire household has attrited. 
  Rather than modeling attrition, Table IV shows that our results continue to hold even 
under a fairly extreme assumption about the outcomes of children not living at home in Round 2. 
In particular, we assign all non-measured treatment children as not being in school, and give 
                                                 
25 Though in this case we would expect to see differences in height. 19 
 
them a BMI and height (or changes in  BMI and height) equal to the 25th percentile of the 
corresponding distribution for other children of their age and sex, while all non-measured control 
children are assigned as being in school and given the 75th percentile of their age*sex BMI and 
height distributions. Though we have no reason to believe children from the treatment group that 
are not measured are any worse off than children from the control group that are not measured, 
even under this assumption that works strongly against our finding an effect, the coefficient for 
the treatment indicator is still statistically significant for girls at the 10 percent level or better for 
schooling and BFA. Using the Kling-Liebman-Katz and F-tests, we still reject at the 5 percent 
level or better that the treatment had no effect on human capital outcomes.
26 
 
D. Distinguishing Returns From Other Mechanisms 
  While the increase in human capital for girls is consistent with parents responding to the 
increased awareness of the returns to human capital for women, as noted above there are many 
alternative reasons why economic opportunities for women might lead to greater investments in 
girls. Of course, even in these cases, the intervention would still show that increases in women's 
employment opportunities have a causal effect on girls' human capital, which is a valuable result 
in itself. However, it is important to understand the mechanism  underlying this relationship, 
which other studies have not been able to identify. Our goal is not to reject that these other 
mechanisms are ever relevant, but simply to demonstrate that in our case they are not operative, 
and thus show that changes in returns can have a direct effect on girls' human capital. As noted, 
the key factor is that most of the non-returns mechanisms (bargaining power, change in the 
household allocation of time, etc.) result from changes in the mother's employment, whereas the 
returns mechanism is based solely on the potential future economic opportunities of currently 
young girls (and thus would take place even with no change in mother's employment). 
  First, the results are unlikely to be explained by increases in mother's bargaining power 
when she gets a job, the most commonly proposed alternative mechanism. The intervention was 
chosen to target the employment opportunities of younger women almost exclusively, in that 
older  women  are  less  likely  to  have  finished  high  school,  speak  English  or  have  computer 
experience. The recruiters also told us that most BPO firms prefer to hire young, unmarried 
women,  which  is  confirmed  by  Oster  and  Millet  (2010)  and  Ng  and  Mitter  (2005).  More 
                                                 
26 For boys, some of the negative effects are statistically significant under these assumptions.  20 
 
generally, in our rural sample very few women with young children work for pay (less than 5 
percent). This is likely to be even more binding for our intervention, since the BPO jobs are not 
rural based, but require commuting or migration. Turning to the data, Table II shows there was 
no increase in paid employment for women over age 25, and few women 24 or younger are 
likely to have children aged 5 or older. In addition, for women with children 5-15, if we regress 
Round 2 paid employment on an indicator for the treatment, we get a coefficient of 0.00321 with 
a standard error of 0.029. Thus, there were no employment gains for mothers of the children 
whose human capital we analyzed. Finally, we can also rule out that the gains for girls are due to 
the  increased  bargaining  power  of  newly  working  mothers  (or  other  adult  women  in  the 
household) by considering households that do not have any women (either living at home or 
temporarily or permanently away from home) who work for pay in Round 2. The top panel of 
Table V shows that the effects continue to hold for this sample.
27 
  Of course, it is possible that the mother's bargaining power may increase even if she does 
not work, simply by the possibility or threat that she could. However, this seems less likely to 
apply in the present case . As noted,  most of the jobs  that we increased access to require a 
secondary school degree, which few older women have. And while a full test of this hypothesis 
isn't possible, we can examine whether the treatment had an effect for hous eholds with women 
for whom the threat of getting a BPO job was much lower, i.e., they do not have a high school 
degree.
28,29 In the middle panel of Table V, we see that the effects are very similar in magnitude 
to the results for the full sample of women in Table III, and remain statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. Finally, we can also examine some simple measures of women's bargaining 
power. The survey asked women whether they participated in household decision-making for a 
range of activities (children's schooling and health care; obtaining health care for themselves; 
purchasing major household items; and visiting friends or family) as well as their "autonomy" 
(whether  they  can  visit  the  market  without  permission;  visit  family  or  friends  without 
                                                 
27 One potential problem with this test is that we stratify on a choice variable affected by our intervention. 
We could instead look at subsamples where not having a woman work is a function of factors exogenous 
to the treatment. For example, it is unlikely there will be a woman working as a result of the intervention 
in households where no adult female member has a high school education. This test is presented next.  
28  Of course, there   are  many  employment opportunities for wom en without a high school degree . 
However, our treatment is unlikely to have caused a change in access to those opportunities. 
29 While this is a select sample (though still a vast majority of women), we might perhaps otherwise 
expect the treatment to have a smaller effect for this group, since their lower education may signal that 
they have lower preferences for education, perhaps even specifically with regards to girls. 21 
 
permission; and whether they were permitted to keep money set aside to spend as they wish). 
Creating two indexes as the sum of the responses to these questions, we find that the treatment 
does  not  have  a  statistically  significant  impact  on  women's  autonomy  or  participation  in 
decision-making.
30  While  these  are  onl y  self-reports  and  thus  may  have  reporting  errors, 
provided those errors are uncorrelated with the treatment, the results are at least consistent with 
the conclusion that women's bargaining power did not change as a result of the treatment. 
  A final possibility to consider is that a mother's bargaining power may be increased even 
if she doesn't work and has no increased  possibility of working, if an older daughter works and 
sends money to her mother. The holding of cash alone may increase the  mother's bargaining 
power  and thereby  improve investments in  her other  daughters.
31  To rule this out, we can 
examine households where no child is older than 16, and thus could not have gotten  one of the 
BPO jobs.
32 The results in the bottom panel of Table V show the gains for girls continue to hold 
for this sample.  
  Thus, overall we conclude that a change in the mother's bargaining power is unlikely to 
explain our effects.  Similar arguments (i.e., that the BPO opportunities are  current or future 
opportunities for daughters, not women old enough to already be mothers themselves , and that 
the  effects  hold  even  in  households  where  no  women  work ),  can  rule  out  several  other 
mechanisms:  that parents invest more in girls because  they  become  more valuable to the 
household when the mother works; changes in the couple's intended fertility, via changes in the 
value of the mother's time; or that a working mother means others take over care of her children, 
and may provide more equal treatment than she does.  The fact that  we find an  effect of the 
treatment even in households where no women work also rule s out that the gains are driven by 
female household members other than the mother getting   one of the jobs  (e.g.,  if an older 
daughter got a job,  she might send money to her younger sisters to buy food or health care to 
                                                 
30 The coefficient on the treatment indicator is 0.112 (0.347) when autonomy is the dependent variable 
(control group mean 1.38) and -0.071 (0.184) when it is participation in decision-making (mean 1.64). 
31 Alternatively, the mother may just directly use the money to increase spending on her daughters, either 
by not telling her husband (so he doesn't offset the additional expenditures) or if the money is more than 
what was previously being spent on children. 
32 The previous results where no women work (including those away) also eliminates this possibility. 22 
 
compensate  for  poor  treatment  by  their  parents,  or  her  younger  sisters  might  now  be  more 
valuable to the household because they take over the older sister's household responsibilities).
33 
  Finally, we can explore whether  our experiment affected human capital investments  in 
girls via changes in income. Changes in current income can be ruled out as in Table  V, where 
there were gains  for girls even  in households  where  no woman  (including those who have 
temporarily  or  permanent ly  left  home )  works  for  pay .
34  Regarding  changes  in  future  or 
permanent/lifetime income (e.g., since a daughter or the mother may work in the future), Table 
III showed that the intervention had no effect for boys. If  the gains for girls are driven by 
increases in  parents' expected lifetime wealth, we would expect at least some  human capital 
gains for boys as well (in fact, we often expect greater effects of wealth on boys than girls; Table 
II provides some evidence of that in the present case). While girls' education may be considered 
a luxury, so we might expect greater increases for girls than boys in response to wealth increases 
once the household is beyond a certain threshold, given the diversity  of wealth in our sample it 
seems unlikely that all households just happened to be at the exact wealth level where boys were 
receiving what the household considered to be  the optimal amount of schooling and health, so 
that all marginal increases in wealth go only to girls' human capital, with no effect at all for boys 
(especially since boys are still very malnourished by international standards, as seen in Table I).   
  Thus, overall, while  there is no test that  can  rule out every alternative, most of the 
primary explanations put forward (changes in bargaining power, income, fertility or household 
time allocation) are not applicable in the present case because the opportunities were  (per our 
intent and design) not for current mothers. It therefore seems likely that it was the increase in the 
potential future value of human capital that lead to increased investment in girls. 
  However, although we can rule out these alternative mechanisms, we do not wish to 
claim that the results are driven entirely by future monetary rewards to women's human capital. 
Parents may expect greater non-market returns for their daughters from these jobs, perhaps even 
                                                 
33 Similar results hold if we look at younger couples (under 35) who could not yet have children old 
enough to get one of the BPO jobs or, as noted, households where no child is over 16. Stratifying in this 
way is less likely to be endogenous with respect to girl's outcomes than whether a woman works.  
34 We also note that changes in current income could not explain all of the observed human capital gains, 
since the 5 percentage point increase in school enrollment is greater than the 2.4 percentage point increase 
in employment. It would then have to be that every woman who got a job had  on average almost 2 girls 
aged 5-15, who additionally went from none enrolled to all enrolled, which seems very unlikely.  23 
 
including greater bargaining power in their future marital household.
35 However, the experiment 
still represents the appropriate one, since these non-monetary gains will also be associated with 
much of the gains in  women's employment being realized today in India , and observed in the 
past in wealthy countries. What is most relevant is that we  can still identify parents as having 
made forward-looking decisions regarding their daughters  based on some perceived increased 
future value of their human capital, i.e., that investment in girls will respond to increases in their 
future economic opportunities. This remains distinct from changes in investments in young girls 
driven by changes related to the mother's employment, such as her greater ability to  influence 
household expenditure or allocation  decisions regarding children. Even just ruling out  for the 
present case the other mechanisms operating via mother's employment is informative because if 
the lesson of the large literature linking women's employment and investment in girls is that it is 
all driven by bargaining power, fertility, etc., there may be other policy instruments  available 
(e.g., reform or enforcement of divorce laws,  strengthening women's inheritance or  property 
rights, family planning services, etc.) that also address  these factors, and  that may perhaps be 
more direct or effective. Another way to view this is that  our results show that it is possible to 
have gains for girls without first needing to change bargaining power, income or fertility.  
     
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  We find that an intervention making employment opportunities for women more salient 
and accessible increased human capital investments in girls. Two key advantages of this study 
are that we supply exogenous variation in opportunities for women and that we can exclude other 
explanations for the link between employment opportunities and  investment in girls, such as 
mother's bargaining power or the allocation of time within the household. 
  Our intervention did not create any new  jobs  for women, and thus we do not view 
recruiting as a solution to the problem of gender disparities in human capital. Rather, the value of 
our results is in demonstrating  that human capital investments in girls respond to  their future 
economic opportunities. Many approaches to gender bias by governments, NGO's, rights groups 
and international organizations have emphasized the social or cultural component of bias (Croll 
                                                 
35 Thus, we do not wish to argue that bargaining power is irrelevant to girls' human capital attainment, but 
instead to emphasize the distinction between bargaining power wielded by the mother and best viewed as 
acting on the current household decision-making process, vs. bargaining power that is just one of many 
future benefits the child herself may receive from human capital investment and future employment. 24 
 
2001). While there is certainly some role for such efforts, our results suggest that expanding 
economic opportunities for women, which should involve a focus on the private sector, can play 
an  important role in  reducing  gender disparities in  human capital. Public policy instruments 
include enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in hiring and promotion, and ensuring equality 
in public sector employment and promotions. Other instruments include reducing barriers to 
women entering the labor market, such as workplace laws strengthening part-time work and 
maternity  leave  or  expanding  women's  access  to  credit,  either  via  commercial  banks  or 
microfinance programs, so women can engage in more entrepreneurial activities (though Field, 
Jayachandran and Pande 2010 discuss possible barriers to this kind of activity for women).  
  The results also suggest there are likely to be improvements in women's human capital 
even in the absence of policy interventions. The rise of the BPO sector, along with rapid growth 
in the white-collar service sector more generally, has been shifting the Indian economy away 
from agriculture and manufacturing. Though employment growth in these new sectors has been 
slower than the growth in their GDP share, this shift is likely to continue to generate a greater 
demand for female labor and a corresponding increase in female labor force participation, as has 
been observed in other countries (Goldin 1990, 1995, 2006). And historical evidence suggests 
such changes can  be rapid. As recently as the 1960s, paid labor force participation rates were 
only around 30 percent in both the United States and Great Britain, increasing to 58 and 71 
percent respectively in less than three decades (Costa 2000). Our results indicate that any coming 
gains in employment opportunities for women will likely result in human capital gains as well. 
  Finally,  the  results  are  also  valuable  in  that  they  show  that  there  is  a  demand  side 
limitation to investment in girls for at least some households. For these households, the limiting 
factor in investment in girls is not related to poverty, or access, costs, distance or quality of 
schooling, nutrition or health care. Though these other factors are certainly important concerns, 
at least some of the problem of low human capital for girls is that parents see little value to 
investing in them. Our experiment shows that clear and salient evidence of greater returns can 
lead to gains for girls even without changes in any of these other factors. 
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TABLE I.  MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS  
AND TESTS OF TREATMENT-CONTROL COVARIATE BALANCE AT BASELINE 
           
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) 






  Difference 
(3) − (2) 
           
Log (expenditure per capita)  6.38  6.37  6.38    0.01 
  [0.66]  [0.65]  [0.67]    (0.023) 
Head's years of schooling  3.76  3.67  3.86    0.19 
  [3.77]  [3.72]  [3.81]    (0.13) 
Spouse's years of schooling  1.80  1.79  1.80    0.022 
  [2.67]  [2.62]  [2.72]    (0.094) 
Family Size  5.46  5.42  5.49    0.072 
  [2.37]  [2.41]  [2.32]    (0.084) 
           
Expect Money From Son When Old  0.96  0.97  0.96    -0.007 
  [0.19]  [0.18]  [0.20]    (0.007) 
Expect Money From Daughter When Old  0.04  0.04  0.04    0.003 
  [0.20]  [0.20]  [0.20]    (0.007) 
Appropriate for women to work for pay:           
Before marriage  0.16  0.16  0.16    -0.002 
  [0.37]  [0.37]  [0.37]    (0.014) 
After married, before children  0.068  0.066  0.071    0.006 
  [0.25]  [0.25]  [0.26]    (0.009) 
           
In school: girls 7-15  0.74  0.75  0.74    -0.011 
  [0.44]  [0.43]  [0.44]    (0.020) 
In school: boys 7-15  0.87  0.87  0.86    -0.010 
  [0.34]  [0.34]  [0.35]    (0.015) 
BMI-for-age (z-score): girls 5-15  -1.25  -1.25  -1.26    -0.015 
  [1.35]  [1.38]  [1.33]    (0.057) 
BMI-for-age (z-score): boys 5-15  -1.31  -1.29  -1.34    -0.056 
  [1.54]  [1.51]  [1.55]    (0.065) 
Height-for-age (z-score): girls 5-15  -2.03  -2.02  -2.04    -0.014 
  [1.34]  [1.32]  [1.37]    (0.057) 
Height-for-age (z-score): boys 5-15  -2.01  -1.99  -2.03    -0.034 
  [1.36]  [1.36]  [1.33]    (0.056) 
           
Notes: Baseline values for key variables, collected in the Round 1 survey (September-October, 2003). Standard 
deviations in brackets in columns 1-3; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors accounting for clustering in 
parentheses in column 4. The last column contains t-tests of the difference in means between the control and the 
treatment samples. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE II. EFFECT OF THE INTERVENTION ON PAID EMPLOYMENT 
 
             
 
      WOMEN        MEN   
    (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
     
18-24  25-44 
 
45-60 
   
18-24  25-44 
 
45-60 
                 
Treatment    0.024
**  0.0031  -0.006    0.002  0.006  -0.004 
    (0.010)  (0.0088)  (0.013)    (0.011)  (0.023)  (0.033) 
                 
                 
R
2    0.054  0.001  0.000    0.000  0.001  0.000 
                 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors accounting for clustering at the village-level in parentheses. All 
variables  measured in round 2 survey.  Dependent  variable is an indicator for  whether an individual  was in paid 
employment in the round 2, post-treatment survey. All regressions also include an indicator for whether expenditure 
data was unavailable (these household are assigned the median sample expenditure). *Significant at 10 percent level. 
**Significant at 5 percent level. ***Significant at 1 percent level. 
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TABLE III. EFFECT OF THE INTERVENTION ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
                         
PANEL A. GIRLS    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2-Round 1) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 


















Treatment    0.052***  0.24***  0.063    0.053***  0.23***  0.060    0.051***  0.27***  0.051 
    (0.019)  (0.070)  (0.066)    (0.019)  (0.069)  (0.063)    (0.21)  (0.051)  (0.051) 
log (expend per cap)            0.025  0.11*  0.147**         
            (0.018)  (0.058)  (0.057)         
Head's Education            0.005*  0.017  0.008         
            (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.009)         
Spouse's Education            0.008**  -0.033*  0.040         
            (0.004)  (0.018)  (0.014)         
Family Size            0.002  -0.014  0.030**         
            (0.004)  (0.014)  (0.013)         
Child's Age            -0.002  -0.038***  0.265***         
            (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.092)         
                         
R
2    0.004  0.007  0.001    0.016  0.017  0.06    0.010  0.012  0.005 
Observations    1,830  2,031  2,031    1,830  2,031  2,031    1,265  1,556  1,556 
Control Group Mean    0.75  -1.25  -2.02    0.75  -1.25  -2.02    0.76  -1.27  -2.05 
                         
Mean Effect      0.11***        0.11***        0.12***   
      (0.027)        (0.025)        (0.024)   
F-stat      7.40        7.62        9.81   
(p-value)      0.000        0.000        0.000   
                         
PANEL B. BOYS    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2-Round 1) 


















Treatment    -0.011  -0.020  0.005    -0.013  -0.030  -0.007    -0.007  0.083  -0.018 
    (0.013)  (0.076)  (0.052)    (0.013)  (0.074)  (0.049)    (0.017)  (0.068)  (0.046) 
log (expend per cap)            0.033***  0.064  0.206***         
            (0.013)  (0.061)  (0.051)         
Head's Education            0.003  0.008  0.008         
            (0.002)  (0.011)  (0.009)         
Spouse's Education            0.004  0.013  0.018         
            (0.003)  (0.014)  (0.014)         
Family Size            0.000  0.001  0.017         
            (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.012)         
Child's Age            -0.011***  -0.102***  -0.087***         
            (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.008)         
                         
R
2    0.00  0.00  0.00    0.017  0.041  0.065    0.001  0.001  0.00 
Observations    2,013  2,295  2,295    2,013  2,295  2,295    1,385  1,735  1,735 
Control Group Mean    0.87  -1.29  -1.99    0.87  -1.29  -1.99    0.87  -1.32  -1.96 
                         
Mean Effect      -0.012        -0.019        0.007   
      (0.023)        (0.021)        (0.021)   
F-stat      0.28        0.44        0.53   
(p-value)      0.84        0.72        0.67   
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors accounting for clustering at the village-level in parentheses. Columns 1-6 use 
Round 2 outcomes as the dependent variable, and Columns 7-9 use the change in outcome from Round 1 to Round 2. For the first 
6 columns, the sample is children aged 7-15 for schooling and 5-15 for BMI and height. For the first columns, the sample is 
children aged 5-12 at baseline (8-15 at round 2). BMI- and Height-for Age are z-scores. All control variables in columns 1-6 are 
measured in Round 2. All regressions also include indicators for whether expenditure or mother's or father's education data was 
unavailable (these household are assigned median values for these variables). "Mean effect" is the mean effect of the treatment 
across the three outcomes for a given specification, computed using the methodology described in Kling, Liebman, and Katz 
(2007). F-stat is from a joint test that the treatment variable is zero in the three specifications. *Significant at 10 percent level. 
**Significant at 5 percent level. ***Significant at 1 percent level.   30 
 
TABLE IV. EFFECT OF THE INTERVENTION ON HUMAN CAPITAL: SENSITIVITY TO ATTRITION 
                         
PANEL A. GIRLS    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2-Round 1) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 


















Treatment    0.037*  0.15**  -0.015    0.039**  0.14**  -0.013    0.028  0.160**  0.011 
    (0.019)  (0.068)  (0.062)    (0.019)  (0.068)  (0.060)    (0.023)  (0.064)  (0.049) 
log (expend per cap)            0.023  0.101*  0.140**         
            (0.018)  (0.057)  (0.055)         
Head's Education            0.006**  0.015  0.006         
            (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.009)         
Spouse's Education            0.009**  -0.032*  0.037***         
            (0.004)  (0.017)  (0.014)         
Family Size            0.004  -0.011  0.032**         
            (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.012)         
Child's Age            -0.003  -0.041***  -0.083***         
            (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.009)         
                         
R
2    0.002  0.003  0.00    0.016  0.013  0.058    0.001  0.004  0.00 
Observations    1,854  2,124  2,191    1,854  2,124  2,191    1,282  1,674  1,649 
                         
Mean Effect      0.059**        0.060**        0.070**   
      (0.026)        (0.025)        (0.027)   
F-stat      2.88        3.01        3.07   
(p-value)      0.038        0.032        0.030   
                         
PANEL B. BOYS    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2-Round 1) 


















Treatment    -0.029**  -0.09  -0.061    -0.030**  -0.097  -0.066    -0.021  -0.029  -0.064 
    (0.013)  (0.073)  (0.050)    (0.013)  (0.072)  (0.047)    (.017)  (0.064)  (0.044) 
log (expend per cap)            0.028**  0.063  0.196***         
            (0.013)  (0.059)  (0.049)         
Head's Education            0.002  0.008  0.008         
            (0.002)  (0.010)  (0.008)         
Spouse's Education            0.005  0.013  0.018         
            (0.004)  (0.014)  (0.013)         
Family Size            0.002  0.002  0.018         
            (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.012)         
Child's Age            -0.01***  -0.10***  -0.09***         
            (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.008)         
                         
R
2    0.002  0.001  0.001    0.017  0.042  0.066    0.001  0.001  0.001 
Observations    2,047  2,388  2,388    2,047  2,388  2,388    1,403  1,851  1,828 
                         
Mean Effect    -0.061***    -0.066***    -0.049** 
      (0.023)        (0.021)        (0.023)   
F-stat      3.10        3.95        1.62   
(p-value)      0.028        0.009        0.19   
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors accounting for clustering at the village-level in parentheses. Columns 1-6 use 
Round 2 outcomes as the dependent variable, and Columns 7-9 use the change in outcome from Round 1 to Round 2. For the first 
6 columns, the sample is children aged 7-15 for schooling and 5-15 for BMI and height. For the first columns, the sample is 
children aged 5-12 at baseline (8-15 at round 2). BMI- and Height-for Age are z-scores. All control variables in columns 1-6 are 
measured in Round 2. All regressions also include indicators for whether expenditure or mother's or father's education data was 
unavailable (these household are assigned median values for these variables). "Mean effect" is the mean effect of the treatment 
across the three outcomes for a given specification, computed using the methodology described in Kling, Liebman, and Katz 
(2007). F-stat is from a joint test that the treatment variable is zero in the three specifications. *Significant at 10 percent level. 
**Significant at 5 percent level. ***Significant at 1 percent level. 
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TABLE V. EFFECT OF THE INTERVENTION: TESTING ALTERNATE HYPOTHESES 
                         
NO WOMAN    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2-Round 1) 
WORKS FOR PAY    (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 


















Treatment    0.056***  0.19**  0.027    0.060***  0.18**  0.032    0.059**  0.23***  0.060 
    (0.021)  (0.075)  (0.072)    (0.021)  (0.074)  (0.070)    (0.26)  (0.079)  (0.059) 
                         
R
2    0.005  0.005  0.001    0.014  0.017  0.053    0.005  0.008  0.001 
Observations    1,353  1,501  1,501    1,353  1,501  1,501    935  1,156  1,156 
                         
Mean Effect      0.094***        0.098***        0.13***   
      (0.031)        (0.029)        (0.030)   
F-stat      4.37        4.94        5.96   
(p-value)      0.006        0.002        0.001   
                         
MOTHERS W/ NO    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2 Outcomes    Round 2-Round 1) 


















Treatment    0.051***  0.23***  0.07    0.051***  0.22***  0.065    0.050***  0.24***  0.068 
    (0.020)  (0.072)  (0.067)    (0.019)  (0.071)  (0.065)    (0.22)  (0.070)  (0.052) 
                         
R
2    0.004  0.007  0.001    0.014  0.015  0.054    0.004  0.009  0.001 
Observations    1,676  1,851  1,851    1,676  1,851  1,851    1,192  1,426  1,426 
                         
Mean Effect      0.11***        0.11***        0.12***   
      (0.027)        (0.026)        (0.025)   
F-stat      6.90        7.04        9.03   
(p-value)      0.000        0.000        0.000   
 
NO CHILD >16 
 
Round 2 Outcomes 
 
Round 2 Outcomes 
  
Round 2-Round 1) 


















Treatment    0.055**  0.204***  0.021    0.058***  0.199***  0.026    0.061**  0.211***  0.046 
    (0.024)  (0.085)  (0.078)    (0.024)  (0.086)  (0.072)    (0.029)  (0.091)  (0.081) 
                         
R
2    0.005  0.013  0.002    0.016  0.028  0.0062    0.006  0.009  0.000 
Observations    1,076  1,202  1,202    1,076  1,202  1,202    720  905  905 
                         
Mean Effect      0.15***        0.15***        0.13***   
      (0.034)        (0.032)        (0.033)   
F-stat      7.29        7.86        5.36   
(p-value)      0.000        0.000        0.002   
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors accounting for clustering at the village-level in parentheses. Columns 1-6 use 
Round 2 outcomes as the dependent variable, and Columns 7-9 use the change in outcome from Round 1 to Round 2. For the first 
6 columns, the sample is children aged 7-15 for schooling and 5-15 for BMI and height. For the first columns, the sample is 
children aged 5-12 at baseline (8-15 at round 2). BMI- and Height-for Age are z-scores. All control variables in columns 1-6 are 
measured in Round 2. All regressions also include log expenditure per capita, head's and spouse's education, family size, child 
age, and indicators for whether expenditure or mother's or father's education data was unavailable (these household are assigned 
median values for these variables). "Mean effect" is the mean effect of the treatment across the three outcomes for a given 
specification, computed using the methodology described in Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007). F-stat is from a joint test that the 
treatment  variable  is  zero  in  the  three  specifications.  *Significant  at  10  percent  level.  **Significant  at  5  percent  level. 
***Significant at 1 percent level. 